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November 27, 2012
Joanna L. Grossman

Who’s the Boss? The Supreme Court Hears Argument on the Meaning of the Term
“Supervisor” in Workplace Harassment Law

What makes someone a supervisor? Employees have practical reasons for knowing the answer to this question,
but courts must also know the answer, because it dictates the standard for employer liability for workplace
harassment. Yesterday, November 26, 2012, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Vance v. Ball State
University, a case raising the question how much power or control an employee must have over other employees
before he or she is deemed a “supervisor” in the harassment context. While the issue might seem technical, it
takes on substantive importance too, as it implicates the scope and strength of harassment law and the ability, or
lack thereof, of victims to enforce their antidiscrimination rights in court.
Workplace Harassment Law: The Basics
In the landmark case of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
(http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/477/57/case.html) , the Supreme Court held that sexual harassment in the
workplace is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It held that both “quid
pro quo” and hostile environment forms of harassment were actionable. This holding has, since then, been
applied universally to other forms of harassment that are perpetrated on the basis of characteristics protected by
Title VII, such as race, ethnicity, national origin and religion.
The Court in Meritor left open, however, the question of employer liability, stating only that a rule of automatic
liability was too harsh for employers, while a rule preconditioning liability on actual notice to the employer was
too harsh for victims. (The ability to sue one’s employer—such as the corporation for which one works—is
central to the enforcement of Title VII, because individuals cannot be held liable under the statute.) The Court
directed lower courts to apply “agency principles”—that is, the law of a principal, and the person or entity that
acts on behalf of that principal—when determining whether employers should be held liable for any particular
type or incidence of harassment. Lower courts took wildly divergent views in the cases that followed,
disagreeing about (1) whether and how to differentiate between harassment by coworkers and harassment by
supervisors, (2) how much weight to give an employer’s policies against harassment, and (3) whether and how to
penalize victims who have failed to make use of available grievance procedures.
http://verdict.justia.com/2012/11/27/whostheboss
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In 1998, the Supreme Court agreed to hear two cases, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
(http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/524/775/case.html) and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth
(http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/524/742/case.html) , which each raised questions about the scope of
employer liability for harassment committed by supervisors. In a joint holding, the Court ruled that for
supervisory harassment culminating in a tangible employment action, such as a demotion or firing, employers are
automatically liable.
For supervisory harassment that does not result in a tangible employment action, the Court also imposed
automatic liability, but it created a twoprong affirmative defense that a defending employer may raise. As the
Court explained, the “defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care
to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise.”
This defense was a compromise between the two extremes in lower court opinions. It derives from the Court’s
interpretation of applicable agency principles, and its determination as to when supervisors are “aided by the
existence of the agency relation” in committing harassment, and when they are not.
Although Faragher and Ellerth both involved harassment by supervisors, the Court also approved the lower
court consensus that claims of harassment by coworkers or third parties should be governed by a negligence
standard, holding employers liable only when they knew or should have known of the harassment, but failed to
take prompt and effective remedial action.
The Scope of the Affirmative Defense for Supervisory Harassment: A Constant Battle
In the almost fifteen years since Faragher and Ellerth were decided, the meaning and scope of the affirmative
defense to liability has become the centerpiece of harassment litigation, as well as the driving force behind the
widespread adoption of antiharassment policies, grievance procedures, and workplace training.
By and large, courts have interpreted the affirmative defense in a way that benefits employers by minimizing
their liability exposure. Courts, for example, have ruled that the adoption of an antiharassment policy alone is
enough to show reasonable effort to prevent harassment. They have also found that employers had exerted
reasonable effort to correct harassment even when the underlying harassment still continued unabated. And, in a
remarkable series of cases, some have held that employers who satisfy the first prong of the affirmative defense
get a free pass on the second, even though the Court clearly stated the test in the conjunctive, so that both must be
satisfied.
More troublingly still, courts have held victims to impossibly high standards under the second prong of the
affirmative defense. There is widespread evidence that harassment victims suffer extremely high rates of
retaliation for complaining and—for that and other reasons—they are very reluctant to file formal complaints.
Nevertheless, courts have rejected most explanations for a harassed employee’s failure to complain, and have
held that delays in filing a complaint that are as short as a week are unreasonable.
The question presented in Vance v. Ball State University—the case that, as I noted in the beginning of this
column, is before the Supreme Court—is thus important because it represents one more opportunity for the Court
to protect—or not protect, as the case may be—employee rights against harassment. A broad definition of
“supervisor” would bring more cases under the stricter standard of liability; a narrow definition would do just the
opposite.
The Facts in Vance v. Ball State University
The case that the High Court heard revolves around allegations by Maetta Vance, an AfricanAmerican woman
who worked in Ball State University’s kitchen and catering department, that she was racially harassed. Many of
her allegations involve coworkers, but at least two involve individuals who she alleges held supervisory
positions. Vance began working at Ball State in 2001, and she was, for many of the years she worked there, the
http://verdict.justia.com/2012/11/27/whostheboss
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only AfricanAmerican employee.
With respect to one harassment claim, which Vance said was perpetrated by William Kimes, the court below
found that Kimes was Vance’s supervisor, but that the alleged harassment was neither sufficiently severe nor
sufficiently pervasive to be actionable, nor was it racial in character. Kimes, in the court’s view, was an “equal
opportunity harasser” whose “difficult demeanor” was imposed on all subordinate employees, regardless of race.
With respect to the other person whom Vance named, Saundra Davis, Vance alleged that Davis slapped her on
one occasion and used racial epithets toward her. For example, Vance alleges that Davis cornered her on an
elevator in a threatening manner, and told her “I’ll do it again.” She also allegedly used the racial slurs
“Buckwheat” and “Sambo” to refer to Vance, both in Vance’s presence and outside it.
The court ruled that Davis, too, was not Vance’s supervisor and applied the standard for coworker harassment.
Under that standard, the employer prevailed because Vance did not notify the employer about some of the
incidents of which she complained, and with respect to other incidents, the employer took steps to remediate the
problem.
The Disagreement Among the Federal Circuits on the Answer to the Question of Who Qualifies as a
“Supervisor”
In granting summary judgment to Ball State, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that Davis
was not Vance’s supervisor. To reach that conclusion, the court applied a definition of supervisor that
encompasses only “someone with the power to directly affect the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s
employment,” with authority that “primarily consists of the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or
discipline an employee.” Applying that standard, the Seventh Circuit held that Davis was not a supervisor, even
if (here, the facts were in dispute) she “periodically had authority to direct the work of other employees.” That
power, the court reasoned, “would still not be sufficient to establish a supervisory relationship for purposes of
Title VII.”
Two other federal circuit courts—the First and the Eighth Circuits—have used the “power to hire and fire”
definition of “supervisor. Three others, however, have adopted a broader definition that also includes individuals
with the authority to direct and oversee the victim’s daily work. It is this circuit split that prompted the Supreme
Court to review this case.
The circuit split turns on agency principles: Is an individual without the power to make tangible employment
actions, but with the power to direct or control daytoday activities, acting as an agent of the employer? The
EEOC, which issued an enforcement guidance in 1999 in the wake of Faragher and Ellerth, takes the broader
view of supervisory status. Under that guidance, an employee who has the “authority to direct [the victim’s]
daily work activities” or the power “to recommend,” though not personally affect, “tangible employment
decisions” qualifies as a supervisor because his ability to harass “is enhanced by his or her authority to increase
the employee’s workload or assign undesirable tasks.”
Why the EEOC’s Broader Definition of “Supervisor” in This Context Is Clearly the Correct One
Without a doubt, the broader definition of “supervisor” that is endorsed by the EEOC is the appropriate one.
Even the defendantemployer does not fully defend the Seventh Circuit’s narrow definition of “supervisor” in its
briefs. (Justice Scalia expressed frustration during oral argument at the fact that “there’s no one here defending
the Seventh Circuit.”) Instead, Ball State argues, primarily, that Davis couldn’t be considered a supervisor under
any of the competing definitions. (That is a plausible interpretation of the facts, since Vance herself is quite
vague about the power Davis might have had over her.) The Solicitor General takes a similar point of view.
During the argument, Justice Kagan seemed supportive of a broader definition of supervisor than the one adopted
by the Seventh Circuit, worrying, for example, that a narrower definition would mean that a professor who
harassed a secretary would be considered merely a coworker just because he didn’t have the power to fire the
secretary. Yet, she implied, their relationship was clearly one of a supervisor and a subordinate, whose life he
http://verdict.justia.com/2012/11/27/whostheboss
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could make a “living hell.”
Justice Roberts was attracted to a brightline rule that would be easy to apply and worried out loud about a soft
rule that would treat someone as a supervisor just because he had the power to pick the music to play in the
office. Is the music picker exercising supervisory authority if he threatens a more junior employee by saying that
“if you don’t date me, it’s going to be country music all day long?”
Whether the definition of “supervisor” will determine the outcome of this case is unclear (which suggests that
perhaps the Court should not have taken this case in the first place). But a ruling on the definition of
“supervisor” will have an impact upon many other cases to come. When employees are harassed by someone
with power to control their status or workload, they are more likely to submit to demands; more likely to feel
threatened and harmed; and less likely to file formal complaints. No one wants to upset the boss, and employees
will put up with more from a person with supervisory authority to avoid consequences of complaining, than they
would from one who lacked that key authority.
A formal definition of supervisory power that focuses exclusively on the ability to create or terminate
employment relationships is naïve. If an employer delegates authority to some employees to dictate the daily
activities of others, then it must be held responsible for their potential misuse of authority. Too narrow a
definition will give employers the incentive to manipulate job titles and responsibilities to minimize the number
of people who qualify as supervisors, while still giving many of them the opportunity to affect the working lives
of their subordinates. The affirmative defense already gives rise to many formoverfunction problems that allow
employers to minimize liability without making a dent in the problem of harassment.
Moreover, a broad definition will not necessarily translate into greater liability for employers. With the
affirmative defense, the employer still has a significant opportunity to avoid liability or damages if it takes
reasonable efforts to prevent and correct harassment. (Notably, plaintiffs win as few as five percent of
employmentdiscrimination cases, so any prediction of a flood of litigation from a Court ruling is unlikely to be
borne out in the real world.)
Workplace harassment still, sadly, persists, even despite clear prohibitions in federal and state law and decades of
litigation seeking to enforce and clarify those rules. The Supreme Court should now take this opportunity to
reinforce the importance of abolishing such harassment, and to strengthen the scheme it established in
Faragher/Ellerth.
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Have a Happy Day!
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